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INDIAN WATER LAW: THE CONTINUING
JURISDICTIONAL NIGHTMARE
INDIAN LAW-REGULATORY JURISDICTION: WATER LAWQUANTIFICATION AND PRIORITY DATES-The Ninth Circuit
set priority dates and quantification limitations on water rights appurtenant to lands reacquired by the Spokane Indian Reservation and
returned to tribal trust status. The Ninth Circuit also approved reg-

ulatory jurisdiction of the State of Washington over excess water use
by non-Indians on the Spokane Indian Reservation. United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).

The spring-fed waters of Chamokane Creek originate north of the
Spokane Indian Reservation and flow south along its eastern boundary
over Chamokane Falls through a gorge. 1 Chamokane Creek flows into
the Spokane River which joins the Columbia River and eventually empties
into the Pacific Ocean. The lands bordering Chamokane Creek within the
Spokane Indian Reservation consist of a patchwork of Indian and nonIndian ownership.2 In addition, some of the reservation land that had
passed into non-Indian ownership has been reacquired by the tribe. This
mixture of land ownership, combined with the competition for water
within the western Chamokane Basin, provides for the basis of controversy in United States v. Anderson.'
1. Chamokane Creek is part of a hydrologic system including Chamokane Creek, its tributaries,
and groundwater basin. Approximately one-half of the Chamokane groundwater aquifer is located
under the reservation in an area ten miles long and two and one-half miles wide. Dellwo, Recent
Development in the Northwest Regarding Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RaS. J. 101, 118 (1980).
2. The tribal trust lands created by the formation of the reservation passed out of Indian ownership
as a result of two co-existing federal land policies. The first federal policy allotted reservation lands
to individual Indians in trust status for twenty-five years followed by deeding the land in fee to the
individual Indian. Lands that were allotted to individual Indians often passed into non-Indian ownership. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 613 (1982). General Allotment Act of 1887,
24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1982)). The second policy was the opening of surplus
reservation land to homesteading by non-Indians. The Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 458. The Act
of May 29, 1908 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to classify lands on the Spokane Indian
Reservation remaining after allotment as either agricultural or timber lands. The surplus agricultural
lands were to be opened to settlement and entry under homestead laws. The homestead policies
were a companion policy to allotment. The federal government designated the homestead lands
because these lands were no longer needed by the tribes. F. COHEN, supra at 613-14. A portion of
the reservation land opened to homesteading on the Spokane Indian Reservation was never claimed
and returned to tribal trust status. Act of May 17, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-240, 72 Stat. 121 (1958).
Additionally, some of the allotment lands and non-Indian homestead lands were reacquired by the
tribe and returned to trust status. Act of June 10, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-335, 82 Stat. 174 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §487 (1982)).

3. United States v. Anderson, 6

INDIAN

L. REP. (AM.

INDIAN

L.

TRAINING PROGRAM)

129 (E.D.

Wash. July 23, 1979). The trial court noted that Chamokane Creek Basin may be over-appropriated.
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INTRODUCTION.

In 1972, the United States, acting on its own behalf and as trustee for

the Spokane Indian Tribe, filed for adjudication' of water rights in the
Chamokane Basin. The Spokane Tribe of Indians was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff.5 The defendants included the State of Washington
and all other persons and corporations having an interest in the disputed
waters. The defendants' water claims relied on water rights certificates,
permits or applications granted by the State of Washington. The district
court held that for all lands reacquired by the tribe, the priority date for
water rights is the date of reacquisition.6 The district court also held that
the State of Washington had the right to exercise regulatory jurisdiction
to issue permits, applications, and certificates for water use within the
external boundaries of the reservation in the absence of contrary federal
law or infringement by the state on the tribe's right to self-government. 7
United States v. Anderson8 was an appeal of an unpublished memorandum opinion and order decided on July 23, 1979, by'the United States
District Court of the Eastern District of Washington. 9 Two issues were
presented on appeal. In the first issue, the United States appealed the
district court"s decision that water rights appurtenant to reacquired reservation lands which had previously passed out of trust status were entitled
to a priority date stemming from the date of reacquisition. The second
issue, brought by the Spokane Indian Tribe, appealed the district court's
decision that the State of Washington had regulatory jurisdiction over the
use of excess water'0 by non-Indians within the Spokane Indian Reservation.
4. Adjudication is "the formal process of settling, describing and recording every water right
dating from pioneer times to present." F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 3637 (1975). The purpose of adjudicating water rights is to quantify the water rights of all claimants
in a given water system.
5. United States v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING PROGRAM) (E.D. Wash.
July 23, 1979).
6. Id.
7. The district court also found that there was a reservation of water right in sufficient quantity
fo fulfill the purposes for which the reservation was created. The court upheld water rights for
irrigation and fishing and recognized that preservation of fishing rights would also result in preservation of the aesthetic and recreational quality of Chamokane Creek. Finally, the trial court
appointed a water master to carry out and enforce its decision. A water master is appointed by the
court under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to report and perform particular acts upon those issues
directed by the court. 5A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACnCE 53-1 (1985).
8. 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
9. United States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING
PROGRAM) 129 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979); Motions to amend the judgment were denied, United
States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643 (Magistrate Dec. 21, 1981); United States v. Anderson, Civil
No. 3643, 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3137 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 1982).
10. Excess water would be the water available after tribal water rights are adjudicated and
quantified. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the state may regulate the use by non-Indian fee owners
of excess water. The permits issued by the state would only be for excess water and may represent
rights that are empty. 736 F.2d at 1365.
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Court's Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on the setting of priority
dates for reacquired tribal land. The court decided that non-Indian allotment lands reacquired by the tribe with perfected water rights carry a
priority date stemming from the date of the formation of the reservation. "
The priority status of non-Indian allotment lands with lost or abandoned
water rights was not specifically decided by this court. In dictum, the
court indicated that the priority of water rights on allotment lands with
lost or abandoned water rights would stem from the date of reacquisition. 2
Those formerly Indian lands within the Spokane Indian reservation which
were homesteaded and reacquired by the tribe with perfected water rights
were held to have priority dates as established by state law. Finally, those
homestead lands with lost or abandoned water rights which were reacquired by the tribe were ruled to have priority dates stemming from the
date of reacquisition.
The Ninth Circuit further affirmed the district court opinion on the
second issue on appeal and found that the State of Washington had regulatory jurisdiction over use of excess Chamokane Basin waters on lands
held by non-Indians within the Spokane Indian Reservation. The case
was remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the decision.
This case note examines both issues in the Ninth Circuit's decision
regarding first, priority dates and quantification of water rights on reacquired lands, and second, state regulatory jurisdiction of water rights on
non-Indian land holdings within the reservation. A major problem with
the Court's analysis in United States v. Anderson is the blurring of these
two distinct issues. Therefore, this case note will examine each issue
separately and highlight their differences.
PRIORITY DATES AND QUANTIFICATION OF WATER RIGHTS ON
REACQUIRED LANDS
Background
Western water law is based on customs and rules developed by the
early miners. The miners established "the rule known as prior appropriation-the law of the first taker."' 3 The first person to divert water and
apply it to beneficial use had first priority. 4 Each of the western states
eventually developed laws and regulations controlling water rights. All1.
United

States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 1362.
13. F. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 22. The system of water appropriation in the western United
States is very different from the riparian doctrines of the eastern United States. Id. The basis for
this distinction was that the west was constrained by the scarcity of water. Id. at 21.
14. The custom of prior appropriation was recognized by the courts in Irvin v. Phillips, 5 Cal.
140 (1855).
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though each state has developed its own set of water laws, the basic
principles of the doctrine of prior appropriation, including the requirement
that the appropriated water be put to a beneficial use, act as a common
denominator. ,5 Water rights are generally created by state governments
as an exercise of their power over the property rights of their citizens. 6
The federal government entered into water regulation later than the
states, and fewer federal laws have been enacted relating to the water
rights of individuals. 7 Federal water law has primarily covered federal
projects 8 and federal lands. Only in connection with some activities on
navigable waters does the federal government consider regulating the
water rights and activities of private individuals. Indian water rights are
also part of the federal law and are based on the creation of Indian
reservations.'" The federal government is viewed as a trustee of Indian
lands and as such has a duty to protect Indian rights.2 °
Indian water rights have been the source of constant conflict between
state and federal authority. Water rights for Indian reservation lands are
not encompassed within the state-regulated prior appropriation system. 2'
Indian water rights are based on the federal reserved rights doctrine set
forth in Winters v. United States. In Winters the Supreme Court held
that the recognition of the Fort Belknap Reservation by the federal government included the waters of the Milk River for necessary agricultural
use by the Indians. The priority date of Winters water rights is based on
the date of the creation of the reservation.23
15. F. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 29. The basic principles of prior appropriation include: (1)
beneficial use of water, not ownership, is the basis of the right to use water and water may be used
in the location where it is needed, not merely at stream bank; (2) water right is a defined quantity
of water; (3) priority of water use, determined by the time of acquisition of water rights, is the basis
for the division of water among appropriators when there is not enough water for all appropriators;
and (4) an appropriation of a water right is transferrable and of indefinite duration; however, the
water right must be put to beneficial use or it may be terminated by abandonment or forfeiture. Id.
at 30-34.
16. Id. at vii.
17. Id. at viii & 9.
18. Federal projects may include dams, hydroelectric projects, and flood control projects.
19. R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 140 (1967).
20. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 596-97. The United States has failed to secure, protect, and
develop adequate water supplies for many Indian tribes. Id. at 596-99. The federal government has
conflicting responsibilities to protect Indian water interests as well as secure its federal water interests.
Id.
21. Brookshire, Merrill & Watts, Economics and the Determination of Indian Reserved Water
Rights, 23 NAT. RES. J. 749, 750 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brookshire]. State water laws do not
govern the use of water by Indians and Indian tribes on Indian lands. United States v. Mclntire, 101
F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939).
22. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
23. The date of the formation of the reservation is usually earlier than any other appropriator in
a basin. Thus, Indian water rights typically predate the rights of other water users. Brookshire, supra
note 21, at 750.
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The alienation of reservation land through the federal policies of
allotment24 and homesteading" created questions regarding the status of
water rights on those alienated lands. Several recent court decisions have
addressed the problems of land passing out of Indian allotment ownership
and into non-Indian ownership.26 Colville and Adair decided issues involving the priority dates and quantification of water rights on Indian
allotment lands acquired by non-Indians. These courts found that on the
allotment lands, the full quantity of Indian rights transferred to the nonIndian purchaser along with the priority date as of the creation of the
reservation. However, the courts also found important limitations on the
non-Indian owner. Once the non-Indian acquires water rights in an allotted
property, these rights are limited by the number of irrigable acres the
non-Indian owns and the quantity of water utilized at the time of transfer
plus any additional water that the non-Indian may appropriate with due
diligence. This water right may also be lost by non-use.
Indian lands also passed out of tribal status and into non-Indian ownership through the federal policy of opening lands for homesteading on
the reservation. 27 Tribal lands which were opened to homesteading were
not available to Indian purchasers because homestead lands were restricted
to United States citizens.2 The homestead lands, acquired by federal
patent, separated from tribal trust status, thus became part of the public
domain.29 In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement,3"
the Supreme Court, relying on the Desert Land Act of 1877, held that
land acquired by federal patent from the public domain did not include
water rights and that the acquisition and retention of water rights on these
lands were subject to state regulatory jurisdiction. 3 Water rights on these
homesteaded lands would have to be perfected under state laws.
24. See supra note 2.
25. Id.
26. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (1983); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647
F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For early cases discussing the transfer
of water rights on allotment lands to non-Indian owners, see United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909
(D. Idaho 1928) (non-Indian allotment purchaser obtains water right to actual acreage under irrigation
and any additional acreage which may be placed under irrigation with reasonable diligence with a
priority date equal to the Indian allotee); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321
(9th Cir. 1956) (non-Indian successors to original allotees receive the same water rights interests as
the original allotees).
27. See supra note 2.
28. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 615.
29. Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
743, 759 (1975).
30. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
31. Id. The Court, however, noted that navigable waters were exempt from state regulatory
jurisdiction in favor of federal regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 162. The implied reservation of waters
for Indian reservations does not deprive Congress of its power over navigational waters. 2 R. CLARK,
supra note 19, at § 144.1.
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ADDRESSING THE TRANSFER PROBLEM
The Ninth Circuit in Anderson initially examined water rights on allotted and homestead lands which had passed from non-Indian ownership
back into tribal trust status. In considering the allotment lands, the Ninth
Circuit relied upon precedents set forth in Colville Confederated Tribes
v. Walton32 and United States v. Adair.33 These courts determined that

allotment lands which passed into non-Indian ownership have been given
the quantity of water in use at the time of transfer, plus any additional
water that may be appropriated with due diligence. These water rights
were also found to be limited by the number of practicably irrigable acres
owned by the non-Indian.34 The Colville and Adair cases also recognized
that water rights on allotment lands owned by non-Indians may be lost
through failure to perfect the appropriation by the non-Indian successor.
Following the reasoning of the Colville and Adair opinions, the Anderson
court found that only those rights that had not been lost through non-use
might be reacquired, or conversely, that the Indian tribe acquired only
those rights attributable to the previous owner.35 In regard to the homesteaded property reacquired by the tribe, the Ninth Circuit relied on
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement36 for the proposition that when reservation property is severed for homesteading the
Winters rights on those lands are terminated. The court found that water
rights on the homestead lands must be perfected through the doctrine of
prior appropriation under state law. The Ninth Circuit in Anderson followed the logic of prior court decisions to hold that homestead lands
reacquired by the tribe contain only those water rights that have been
perfected by the prior owner."7 The transfer of regulatory power over the
water right, if any, is not addressed by the court. The Ninth Circuit
recognized reacquired homestead lands without water rights as a newly
formed federal reservation and found that the implication of Winters rights
set a priority date of the time of reacquisition.38 The court failed to define
the meaning of an implication of Winters rights.
ANALYSIS
The court in Anderson carefully addressed the issues of the priority
and quantity of water rights on reacquired lands. The court's analysis
32. 647 F.2d 42.
33. 723 F.2d 1394.
34. The practicably irrigable acreage criterion for quantifying Indian water rights was established
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). In Arizona the Supreme Court defined practicably
irrigable acreage as "the various acreages of irrigable land which the Master found ... to be
reasonable." Id.
35. 736 F.2d at 1362.
36. 295 U.S. 142.
37. 736 F.2d at 1363.
38. Id.
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served as a logical extension of prior rulings on similar problems, but
the court failed to critically analyze the reasoning of the prior opinions.
In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, upon reacquisition of nonIndian allotment lands, the tribe received the quantity of water that had
been used with due diligence by the previous owner. The Ninth Circuit
stated that the full measure of the Indian water right passed from the
Indian allottee to the non-Indian purchaser and this water right was reacquired by the tribe. 39 The court, however, explained that if the non-Indian
successor did not appropriate the full measure of the predecessor Indian
allottee's reserved water right, then the water right would be reduced to
the measure used by the non-Indian successor.4' Therefore, the tribe
reacquires only those rights that have not been lost. This holding indicates
a confusion on the court's part as to whether the water right is a reserved
Winters right or an appropriative right.
This decision, in effect, makes the water rights on reacquired allotment
lands an appropriative water right dependent on the diligence and efforts
of non-Indian transferees. When these rights are reacquired by the tribe
the court has limited the water rights attached to these lands. 4' The court
has failed to attach any Winters rights to the reacquired allotment lands.
Furthermore, the court did not analyze the situation when allotment lands
are returned from non-Indian ownership without any water rights. Would
any water rights attach to the allotment lands? Additionally, the prior
court opinions did not indicate which sovereign would supervise the
appropriation of the non-Indian water right. However, it may be implied
from the court's language that the state would regulate the appropriation.
The Anderson court further compounded that omission of not determining
which sovereign had jurisdiction over the water rights by recognizing and
transferring that undefined right back to the tribe.42
The courts decision on the homestead lands reacquired by the tribe
actually affected only 28.7 acres which the trial court found to be prac39. Id. at 1362.
40. Id.
41. 1,798 acres of allotment lands were restored to tribal trust status on the Spokane Indian
Reservation. 562 acres were found to be practicably irrigable by the lower court and the water rights
for these lands would carry a priority date of 1877. The district court awarded a reserved right of
1,686 acre-feet of reserved water to the practicably irrigable allotment acreage restored to the tribe.
This indicates a reserved water right, but neither the district court nor the court of appeals considered
how this conflicted with the reacquirement of appropriation on reacquired allotment lands. The entire
Spokane Indian Reservation was found by the lower court to contain 8,460 acres of practicably
irrigable land, which consisted of 1,880 acres of bottomland and 6,580 acres of benchland. United
States v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING PROGRAM) 129 (E.D. Wash. July
23, 1979).
42. There is a limit to the expansive nature of the water rights held by non-Indian owners of
allotment lands because of the requirement that the water right is limited by the number of practicably
irrigable acres and that the non-Indian appropriate the water with due diligence. These lands, however,
carry a priority date as of the creation of the reservation. This may disrupt other appropriators in
the basin and create competition with the tribe.
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ticably irrigable.4 3 These lands contained no appropriated water right
because they were lands opened for homesteading, but never claimed.
These lands, according to the court's decision, would carry a priority
date of 1958, the date of reacquisition. This late priority date, in an
overappropriated water basin, would effectively bar the tribe from obtaining water for use on these lands." Therefore, in this case, the 28.7
acres of reacquired land will have no water.
Apparently very few acres will be affected by the late priority date in
this case. However, on other reservations where more land is reacquired
from homestead status, the priority date may severely limit the tribe's
ability to govern itself and its economic development. The court makes
water rights on lands severed from the tribe for homesteading dependent
on the diligence of the homesteaders. For lands never homesteaded, or
those without perfected water rights, there would be essentially no water
for use on the land because of the late priority date.
The Anderson decision is in conflict with federal goals of reservation
self-sufficiency. Self-determination of the tribes is based on the notion of
Indian policy-making centered at the tribal government level.45 A major
goal of self-determination is the economic development of the reservation.46 Many programs have been instituted to regain alienated tribal land
holdings and to overcome the termination policies of the federal government.47 The reestablishment or enlargement of a reservation without water
is meaningless. The court is more concerned about disrupting water rights
of other appropriators in the basin. This concern is reflected in the court's
holdings limiting water rights in reacquired lands to rights already perfected by transferees. The court is clearly protecting the reliance of the
present homesteaders and non-Indian allotment owners.48 Although the
court is returning lands to tribal trust status on paper, it has failed to
recognize that lands without water rights are lands with no practical utility.
Regarding those lands returned to tribal trust status without water rights,
the court should attach full Winters rights. Otherwise these lands, originally part of the reservation, would be worthless to the tribe. This decision
43. A 'total of 5,451 acres of land opened to homesteading were returned to the tribe. United
PROGRAM) 129 (E.D. Wash. July
23, 1979).
44. Id. The trial court indicated that the Chamokane Basin may be overappropriated.
45. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 180.
46. Id. at 196.
47. Id. at 196-200. The statute for reconsolidation of the Spokane Indian Tribe noted that one
purpose for land consolidation was to provide an economic land base for the tribe. Act of June 10,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-335, 82 Stat. 174 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §487 (1982)).
48. The court must be careful to avoid prior cases that warn courts engaged in determining water
rights for Indian reservations not to engage in the balancing of Indian interests and non-Indian
interests. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 587.

States v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING
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forces the tribe to accept the loss of water rights on these reacquired
reservation lands.
The second issue on appeal addressed by the Anderson court was state
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian water use.
STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION
Background
In Worcester v. Georgia,49 Chief Justice John Marshall articulated the
first analysis of Indian sovereignty in conjunction with state regulatory
power. Marshall noted, "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force . . .""
Since Marshall's landmark decision, state regulatory jurisdiction has
been allowed within Indian reservations only in limited situations." Primarily, the interests of the federal, state, and tribal governments must be
examined to determine whether state jurisdiction would violate federal
law. 2 The courts developed two independent, but related, tests in order
to determine jurisdiction over a particular question. 3 First, the exercise
of state regulatory jurisdiction may be preempted by federal law.54 This
test is based on the rationale that the states cannot interfere with federal
plenary power.55 Second, without governing acts of Congress, the exercise
of state jurisdiction is permitted if it does not infringe "on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 5 6
These two tests are "independent because either, standing alone, can be
a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken
on the reservation.57
The White Mountain Apache Court emphasized that the preemption
and infringement tests are interrelated because, "[t]he right of tribal selfgovernment is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power
49. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
50. Id. at 561.
51. For a history of this progression, see McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164 (1973); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959); Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1982); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico,
630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980).
52. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
53. Id.; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
54. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see, e.g., McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
55. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 273.
56. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
57. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142.
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of Congress.""8 In White Mountain Apache, the Indian tribe and a nonIndian logging company operating solely within the reservation filed suit
for refund of motor carrier license and fuel taxes seeking declaratory
relief from regulation by the State of Arizona. The Supreme Court found
that extensive regulation of the tribal timber enterprise by the federal
government preempted the exercise of state authority.
Tribal sovereignty generally extends "over both their members and
their territory." 9 As the Court in White Mountain Apache noted, state
law is generally inapplicable to Indians on the reservation because at that
point, "federal interest in encouraging tribal sovereignty is at its strongest. "'
Tribal jurisdiction over conduct of non-Indians on the reservation has
been a more difficult problem. The issue of sovereign power over nonmember activities has been brought to the forefront of Indian jurisprudence because of non-Indian ownership of fee lands within reservation
boundaries.6
Courts have found that as tribes were incorporated, into the United
States certain tribal sovereign powers have been implicitly divested.6"
The divested powers included such attributes of external tribal sovereignty
as the freedom to alienate land without federal government consent and
the ability to enter into relations with foreign governments.63 In Montana
v. United States' the Supreme Court invalidated that portion of a Crow
Tribal regulation prohibiting hunting and fishing within the reservation
by non-members of the tribe on land owned by non-Indians within the
exterior boundary of the reservation. The court found that federal laws
and the tribe's inherent sovereignty did not support regulation of nonIndians on fee lands within the reservation. The Montana court followed
the rationale in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and found that "the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of non-members of the tribe." 6 5
The Montana court stated that "Indian tribes retain some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian
fee lands. "' The Montana court noted that the tribe may regulate the
58. Id.
59. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
60. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144.
61. See supra note 2.
62. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), cited in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981).
63. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (98
Wheat.) 543 (1823).
64. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
65. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 491 U.S. 191 (1978), cited with approval in Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). In Oliphant, a criminal case, the Supreme Court
recognized the rights of the federal government to uphold the liberty of United States citizens.
66. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
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activities of non-members through taxation, licensing, or other means,
when the conduct of the non-Indian threatens or has direct effect on the
health and welfare, political integrity, or economic security of the tribe.67
Tribes are able to regulate the activities of non-members who enter contractual relationships with the tribe or its members.6" Civil regulatory
jurisdiction of the tribe over non-members has also been approved in the
areas of taxation, zoning, health and safety regulations, and riparian water
rights.69

Regulation of Water Rights
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed regulatory jurisdiction over nonIndian water use within a reservation. In Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton,7 ° the Ninth Circuit examined the issue of whether the state had
regulatory jurisdiction over water use in the No Name Creek Basin of
eastern Washington. This area was encompassed by the Colville Reservation and included land owned in fee by non-Indians. The Ninth Circuit
found that the state had no power to regulate water in the No Name system
and that the state permits were of no force and effect. 7 The Ninth Circuit
found that state regulatory authority in the No Name Basin was preempted
by the federal government in the creation of the Colville Reservation. 72
The Colville court cited FederalPower Commission v. Oregon for the
proposition that water use on a federal reservation is not subject to state
regulation without explicit federal recognition of state authority. 7" In support of preemption the court also cited United States v. McIntire74 for the
proposition that state water laws are not controlling on Indian reservations
because Congress had not enacted legislation for state control of water."
67. Id. at 565-66.
68. Id.
69. Menion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (taxation); Ramah Navajo School
Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 454 U.S. 1079 (1982) (taxation); White Mountain Apache v. Bracker,
488 U.S. 136 (1980) (taxation); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1982) (zoning); Cardin v. Le La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982) (health and safety regulations); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (riparian rights).
70. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 52.
73. 349 U.S. 435 (1935). The actual holding of the court was that a license from the United
States to build a dam on reservation lands could not be stopped by lack of state permission. Id. at
443-45. This case has been construed to hold that former western water law giving the states control
of water on the public domain was not applicable to federal reservation lands. However, the Supreme
Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), held that federal non-Indian reservations carried
reserved water rights. See Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENVER L.J.
473 (1977).
74. 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1934).
75. In McIntire, the Court held that Montana statutes specifically provided that Indian lands shall
remain under federal regulatory control. 101 F.2d at 654.
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The Colville court noted that the State of Washington enacted identical
enabling language as in the Mclntire case. 76
The Colville court noted the general deference of the federal government to state plenary control of water use on the public domain. The
Colville court citing Federal Power Commission v. Oregon stated that,
"[tihis deference is not applicable to water use on a federal reservation
at least where such use has no impact off the reservation. ,"7 The court
noted that "[w]hen land is set aside for an Indian Reservation, Congress
has reserved it for federal as opposed to state needs. Because the No
Name System is located entirely within the reservation, state regulation
of some portion of its waters would create the jurisdictional confusion
Congress has sought to avoid." 78 The Colville court thus concluded "[i]n
creating the Colville Reservation, the federal government preempted state
control of the No Name System."79 The court specifically did not discuss
the effect of water rights on the opening of reservation lands for homesteading.80
Although the Colville court based its decision on preemption, the court
discussed whether state regulation of water use infringed on the tribal
right to self-government in regulating the tribe's health and welfare. The
court noted that the use of water on non-Indian land within the reservation
involved the tribe's water rights because "[a] water system is a unitary
resource. The actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on
other users." 8'
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
In Anderson the Ninth Circuit considered whether state jurisdiction
over non-Indian water use within the Spokane Indian Reservation was
barred either by federal preemption or by infringement on the right of
reservation Indians to self-government. The Anderson court applied the
standard derived from Montana v. United States that tribal regulation of
non-Indian conduct on fee land within the reservation is withdrawn as a
result of tribal dependent status unless one of two exceptions applies.8 2
First, the court, in Montana, found no consensual agreement between the
non-Indian water users and the tribe. The tribe and the non-Indians had
76. Washington Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
77. Colville, 647 F.2d at 52.
78. Id. at 53. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
79. Colville, 647 F.2d at 53.
80. Id. at 53 n. 16. Thus, the Colville court did not discuss water rights on homestead lands as
was encountered in Anderson.
81. Id. at 52.
82. 736 F.2d at 1365.
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not entered into any consensual agreements or mutual dealing which
would subject the non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction. Second, the court,
citing Montana v. United States, found no conduct which so threatened
or had such a "direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribe," so as to confer tribal
jurisdiction. 83 The court concluded that the State of Washington had the
authority to regulate excess Chamokane Basin waters use by non-Indians
on fee land. The Spokane tribe's water rights would be preserved by the
federal water master who would adjudicate all available water rights
within the basin. The court noted that the state would regulate only the
use of excess water not needed by the tribe.
In addition, the court found no direct federal preemption of state regulation. The court stated, "that no federal statute or regulatory scheme
expressly or impliedly governs water use by non-Indians on the Spokane
Reservation," and that the balance of interest was in favor of the state. 84
Therefore, there was no preemption by the creation of the reservation.
The court distinguished Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton on several grounds; the first was based on the geography and hydrology of the
No Name Basin. The No Name River was non-navigable and entirely
within the boundaries of the reservation. Secondly, non-Indian lands
within the reservation were allotted rather than opened for entry and
settlement. Lastly, the interest of the tribe in regulating waters used from
the No Name River was critical to the lifestyle of its residents and the
development of its resources.85
The Anderson court felt that the weight of the state's interest depends
"in large part on the extent which waterways or aquifers transcend the
exterior boundaries of Indian country." ' 86 In Colville, the stream was
distinguished because it was small, non-navigable, and located entirely
within the reservation. Additionally, water use by non-Indians would
impact tribal fisheries or agriculture. In contrast, Chamokane Creek originated outside the reservation, formed the eastern boundary of the Spokane
Indian Reservation, and much of the non-Indian land within the reservation was adjacent to the creek.
The court then weighed the competing federal, state, and tribal interests
and found that state interests predominated. The court noted as central
to its reasoning, "the fact that the interest of the state in exercising its
jurisdiction will not infringe on the tribal right to self-government nor
83. Montana, 450 U.S. at 546.
84. 736 F.2d at 1365.
85. The Anderson court noted that in Colville water use by non-Indians would impact tribal
fisheries and agriculture. Chamokane Creek was contrasted only on the basis that it flows outside
the boundaries of the reservation. Id. at 1366.
86. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1358.
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impact on the Tribe's economic welfare because those rights have been
quantified and will be protected by the federal water master. ,87

ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit decision does not fully address the question of whether
regulation of non-Indian water use within the Spokane Indian Reservation
was preempted by the federal government. The same court in Colville
found that state regulation of water use on Indian reservations was preempted
by the federal government. In the Colville case, the court relied on the
enabling legislation of the State of Washington and the general rationale
that federal reservations are exempt from state water regulations. The
Anderson court failed to explain why the federal government had not
preempted state regulation of water use on this reservation as it had in
Colville.
The court found no infringement of the right of the Spokane Tribe of
Indians to self-government. Using a balancing approach to weigh the
competing tribal and state interests, the court compared the geography
and hydrology of the Chamokane Creek Basin to the State of Washington's
interest in developing a comprehensive water program for the allocation
of surplus waters. The Anderson court found that the state's interest
weighed more heavily and ignored similar tribal interests in water planning.18 Additionally, the court failed to address the federal interests involved resulting from the federal trust relationship to the tribe and the
independent federal interest in the navigable creek which flows into the
Columbia River. The factors used by the court did not adequately reflect
the tribal interests in self-government. The court stated that the federal
water master would preserve tribal water rights and that the state would
only be regulating excess water use89 by non-Indian fee land owners within
the external boundaries of the reservation." This reasoning seems to blur
the distinction between quantification of water rights and the ultimate use
of those water rights. 9' The question of water use regulation within reservation boundaries fundamentally relates to the nature of tribal sover87. Id. at 1366.
88. Perhaps the tribes should take affirmative action by enacting water codes and planning for
future water needs.
89. See supra note 9.
90. 736 F.2d at 1366. There may be an argument that the opening of the reservation to allotment
and homesteading did not reduce the reservation status of these lands. See Dellwo, supra note 1,
at 103-05 (1980).
91. "Police power authority to regulate and control water use within an Indian Reservation raises
different questions from those considered in . . . proprietary rights and adjudication jurisdiction."
F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 604.
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eignty over the lands within its borders.92 The regulation of water use
cannot be easily separated from the overall goals of the tribe to plan for
its economic future and its health, safety, and welfare.
The Ninth Circuit in Colville previously noted,
Regulation of water on a reservation is critical to the lifestyle of its
residents and the development of its resources. Especially in arid
and semi-arid regions of the West, water is the lifeblood of the
community. Its regulation is an important sovereign power.93
The Anderson decision noted that only excess waters on lands owned
by non-Indians would be regulated by the state. The Ninth Circuit indicated that excess waters were "surplus, non-reserved Chamokane Basin
waters." By the nature of this definition the court is referring to state
regulation of water use on non-Indian lands within the reservation. Even
though the water to be regulated is the excess of the reservation's Winters
rights, the water will be utilized within the reservation boundaries. Therefore, the impact of the court's decision will occur within tribal boundaries,
not off the reservation. The use of water on a non-Indian fee parcel will
impact its neighbors. For instance, the state may approve an industrial
use for water while the tribe has planned for the entire area to be agricultural, thereby creating pollution problems and lack of coordination of
external effects on adjacent lands. In addition, groundwater management
requires unitary management to maintain quality and prevent depletion.9 4
Not only is this fragmentation of regulation nonsensical, but the Anderson decision creates the jurisdictional nightmare referred to in Federal
Power Commission v. Oregon.95 Within the geographical territory of the
reservation there will be intermixed governmental regulation of water
use. Even if the opinion refers solely to a few homestead lands, it opens
the door for further state intrusion into tribal sovereignty within the reservation. Vast amounts of land within other reservations may be subject
to state regulatory control. This opinion erodes the federal policy of tribal
self-determination. If a tribe cannot plan for use of water on the reservation
in conjunction with its land use powers, then the tribe cannot guide its
economic future.
As a matter of both logic and sound practical administration, jurisdiction must depend on the location of the property, not on the
92. ". . . [t]here is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining whether
state authority has exceeded the permissible limits." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488
U.S. at 151.
93. Colville, 647 F.2d at 52. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.
1079. A state's power to regulate water use for times of shortage is a sovereign power.
94. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 604 n.4.
95. 349 U.S. at 448. See United States v. Frank Black Spotted Horse, 282 F. 349 (1922).
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owner's race or the title status of the property. If jurisdiction were
to depend upon whether the land was in trust or fee patent status or
whether it was owned by an Indian or non-Indian, the result would
96
be chaos, confusion, sham transactions, and inherent instability.
CONCLUSION
This opinion compounds the inherent problems of piecemeal ownership
patterns within the Spokane Indian Reservation by creating within the
reservation a patchwork of state and tribal regulatory jurisdiction. This
decision diminishes tribal control over water use within the reservation.
The essence of the problem in this case is the existence of a water basin
shared between the tribe and the State of Washington. Perhaps the tribe
and the state need to recognize that they have equally valid reasons for
asserting regulatory jurisdiction over water and water rights. A shared
basin requires shared planning. Future planning may be a worthwhile
joint endeavor for the tribe and the state. A solution may be the creation
of a joint state-tribal management authority for shared basins, with a
provision for federal arbitation.
MARTE LIGHTSTONE

96. Pelcyger, supra note 29, at 770.

